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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
NATIONAL STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW TRIAD -CONGRUENT OR DIVERGENT?
At first blush the capabilities of the New Triad outlined in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) seem to resonate with post-9/11 national and military strategic documents. In those documents, senior leaders call for new capabilities and innovative ways to deter and defeat enemies of the United States, and the NPR essentially revamped the former nuclear
Triad in order to provide these new capabilities.
However, it is not clear that the United States can achieve them in the timeframe described (i.e., by 2012). While there is little debate that the traditional nuclear Triad, and, perhaps the nature of deterrence, required major overhaul following the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of 2001, it is also not clear that the major changes described by the NPR will achieve the desired effects against threats in the 21st century. The DoD implementation plan for the NPR, published in 2003, describes specific tasks, timelines, and responsibilities in order to achieve adequate operational capability for the New Triad. Overall operational numbers of nuclear weapons will be reduced, and advanced conventional weapons fielded in order to supplement or, in certain circumstances, replace them. While this concept sounds reasonable, the debate on how best to achieve success, or whether success is even achievable, is still ongoing. For example, precision-guided, variable-yield, earth-penetrating nuclear weapons are absent in the nuclear stockpile, but the implementation plan only calls for study of earth penetrating nuclear weapons.
Further improvements to nuclear weapons may be required to address military and political realities such as increased concern for the consequences of offensive strikes on noncombatants, WMD proliferation, and use of hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) by enemy combatants. Not surprisingly, however, introduction of new nuclear weapons or improved capabilities for existing ones evokes strong reactions from arms control advocates, anti-nuclear scientists and activists, as well as proponents of current administration policies. Likewise, the capabilities expected by fielding advanced conventional weapons might not be sufficient.
Advanced conventional weapon development comes with certain inherent risk when one considers the science and technology challenges -not to mention programmatic ones -in order to achieve operational deployment. This paper will evaluate whether the current implementation of the NPR through 2012 results in a congruent or divergent path of support for national security strategy. This evaluation and analysis will be accomplished through examination of the nuclear and deterrence landscape following the Cold War, the view through the lenses of current national and military strategic documents (particularly as they relate to the nuclear and non-nuclear strike leg of the New Triad), arguments for and against new nuclear weapons, and the challenges facing advanced conventional capabilities.
POST COLD WAR NUCLEAR STAGE
The end of the Cold War left the United States with a nuclear stockpile of over 25,000
warheads, but a less clear threat to apply the calculus of deterrence. 1 US policy grew from the relatively simple algebraic logic of massive retaliation during the Eisenhower administration, a flexible response policy in the 1960s, a more complex countervailing strategy in response in improvement in Soviet capabilities in the 1970's, and significant modernization of nuclear forces to encourage peace through strength in the 1980's. 2 The nuclear stockpile at the end of the Cold War consisted of nuclear weapons ranging from cruise missiles and gravity bombs to reentry vehicles (RVs) and reentry bodies (RBs).
These generally fell into two categories: strategic (primarily RVs, RBs, and certain thermonuclear bombs) and tactical (generally shorter range, lower yield weapons). A Triad of strategic delivery systems consisting of bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) could carry the weapons to their targets. This
Triad, fundamentally unchanged since the 1960s, was designed to provide maximum probability for nuclear force survival in the event of nuclear attack and was the centerpiece of US strategic deterrence strategy and policy. The end of American/Soviet confrontation led quickly to several nuclear initiatives responding to the rapidly changing threat landscape.
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), introduced in 1991, eliminated all ground launched tactical nuclear weapons from the inventory, and removed all nuclear weapons from aboard naval vessels (except SSBNs) and ground bases. PNIs also took nuclear capable aircraft and ICBMs (those scheduled for deactivation) off alert. 3 The United States unilaterally stopped underground tests (UGTs) of nuclear weapons in 1992 in recognition of the changing world environment. Additionally, the United States signed the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) with Russia in 1993 further reducing the number of strategic warheads and the systems carrying them. 4 A result of these sweeping and remarkable initiatives solidified the movement of US strategy away from Cold War predominant reliance on nuclear forces to deter against nuclear attack and to counterbalance Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe to a broader position that nuclear forces were necessary to deter against the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by non-peer adversaries, and to serve as a hedge against the emergence of an overwhelming and unanticipated conventional threat. 5 These initiatives led to a policy of "Lead" (unilateral reductions in numbers as necessary) and "Hedge" (guard against the possibility of a reemergence of a Soviet-like threat with a large stockpile of nuclear arms). force structure, and the search for elusive "peace dividends" to fund conventional technological pursuits after the first Gulf War led to a natural de-emphasis of almost all things "nuclear."
Funding for nuclear programs (beyond the SSP) declined, infrastructure deteriorated, 6 and the resultant stockpile in 2000 consisted of weapons developed during the Cold War. This is not to say that nuclear weapons were completely ignored during the previous decade. Personnel within the nuclear community grappled with the rapid change in international and political landscape and attempted to develop and recommend appropriate levels and scope of nuclear management, planning, and policy. It is probably fair to say, however, that their priorities were not congruent with those of high level defense policy-makers.
POST 9/11 NATIONAL AND MILITARY STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS
Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, publication of national and military strategic documents established ends, ways, and to a certain degree, the means for strategic concepts involving nuclear weapons and the notion of deterrence in the new millennium. capabilities with non-nuclear ones, thereby increasing offensive effectiveness and credibility.
The second leg appeared to be an acknowledgement that the ability to strike enemies with the spectrum of offensive capabilities was not in itself sufficient to deter them. In this case the United States would need both active (find and defeat) and passive (respond to) defenses. The defenses and improved capability to respond would add to the deterrence equation by discouraging attacks. The third leg of responsive infrastructure is a response to significant defense military downsizing in the previous decade and the corresponding atrophy of the nuclear infrastructure. 8 The complex infrastructure that designed and fielded exquisite nuclear weapons (from a scientific and engineering point of view) during the Cold War can no longer respond quickly to a request to build and field new nuclear capabilities. A solid infrastructure is required to reduce the size of the nuclear stockpile because weapons dismantlement is a complex, laborious, and expensive process. 9 In summary, the NPR drew upon the QDR, but also presented a way to achieve the ends described in documents that were to follow. It sought to modify a system of deterrence designed for the Cold War, but not to abandon nuclear weapons altogether.
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), published in September 2001, explicitly stated four defense policy goals (the "ends" essentially restated in subsequent documents) to assure, dissuade, deter threats and coercion, and -if deterrence fails -decisively defeat the enemy.
First, nuclear weapons have played a part in all four ends in the past traditionally by first assuring allies without nuclear weapons that they fell under the US nuclear umbrella. Second, our economic and scientific capabilities to rebuild a nuclear arsenal if necessary serve to dissuade others who may hope to rise as a peer competitor. Third, US nuclear capabilities have served as a successful deterrent for nearly 60 years. Finally, should deterrence fail, nuclear weapons serve as an ultimate "trump card" to defeat an enemy determined to use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The question remains whether the current stockpile still supports these ends after 2001. The QDR also emphasized movement to a capabilities-based force able to defeat adversaries relying on deception and asymmetry. It recognized that transformation was critical to strategic success, and that continuing "business as usual" within the Department was not a viable option. This transformation included denying the enemy sanctuary through improved surveillance and rapid precision strike.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The National Security Strategy (NSS), published in September 2002, obliquely mentioned nuclear weapons as an effective Cold War deterrence tool and acknowledged that the United
States and Russia had reduced nuclear stockpiles. However, there were other areas in the document that resonated within the nuclear community. After restating enduring American values and goals, the NSS pointed out the desire to "prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction" and to "transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century." If necessary, these requirements could be carried out through preemptive strikes against rogue states and terrorists. This is an important point in that the NSS explicitly points out that the United States can no longer count on traditional means (nuclear weapons) to deter an attacker bent on using WMD as an asymmetric means. The President therefore needs a broader range of military options to meet these threats. missions, and additional space responsibilities (the US space command no longer existed).
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For the purposes of this discussion, the GS role is significant. This represents planning and execution of theater nuclear or non-nuclear strikes conducted anywhere, anytime, with precision, accuracy, speed, and required lethality. It required a major reorganization of not only personnel and structure in the command, but also a significant change in adaptive planning, were noted for continuing to provide an important deterrence role; however, the New Triad provided a strategic deterrence capitalizing on non-nuclear strike capabilities as well. The end result was described as a "diverse portfolio of capabilities" to deter a wide range of adversaries.
JOINT OPERATING CONCEPT FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
The NMS also introduced the Joint Operating Concept (JOC) for Strategic Deterrence.
This publication, one of four subsets of the Joint Operations Concept, has a role in developing the capabilities-based systems outlined in the QDR, NDS, and NMS. It described nuclear capabilities required to bolster future US deterrence. These included a nuclear strike capability that can threaten HDBTs, limit collateral damage, deny sanctuary; and increase credibility of nuclear threats -regardless of whether these threats are ambiguous or unambiguous. This JOC also called for a revitalization of the nuclear infrastructure to achieve this capability. 15 This is in recognition that building a comprehensive nuclear capability to threaten, limit, deny, and increase credibility is problematic given the current state of the nuclear weapon program infrastructure. At a minimum, it would take a considerable period of time and fiscal resources for NNSA to design and field a new weapon given the rigid nuclear weapon developmental process and legal constraints.
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW IMPLEMENTER
The classified NPR implementer, published March 2003, presents ways to achieve the ends described in the NPR. The time to its publication, nearly 18 months after the NPR, is perhaps indicative of the challenges faced by OSD to achieve the overall objectives for the New Triad. Internal OSD debate over ownership of the implementation process between the offices of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) seemed to slow publication. 16 Interestingly NNSA published its respective implementer in early spring of 2002; presumably to "lean forward" and tackle the difficult tasks of managing a rapidly changing stockpile, infrastructure improvements, and the movement and security of weapons.
The NPR implementer is generally directive in nature. It describes the elimination and modification of specific weapon system(s) in order to achieve 1700 -2200 operationally deployed nuclear warheads, as well as the fielded capabilities required to achieve a viable New Triad ( Figure 2 ).
FIGURE 2. GLIDE PATH FOR IMPLEMENTATION 17
Unclassified portions direct USD(P) and USD(AT&L) to develop strategic plans for the New Triad, develop conventional and nuclear metrics to quantify effectiveness of integrated strike plans, develop a plan to correct limitations in nuclear effects modeling, implement recommendations from the Defense Science Board study on HDBTs, assist the Nuclear Weapons Counsel to provide effective review of NNSA programs as they relate to OSD requirements for the New Triad, conduct periodic reviews for infrastructure adequacy, conduct studies to ensure strategic platforms and appropriate weapons are developed for the 20+ year future, and call for a DSB study to forecast required DoD skills. 18 USD(P), in coordination with multiple DoD, OSD, and USG partners, are to conduct periodic reviews (vetted through a senior steering group) in order to evaluate risks, review programs, assess the strategic environment, and identify gaps between capabilities required and those expected of the New Triad.
DOCUMENT SUMMARY
A common thread woven through the fabric of current national and military strategic documents is a call for increased capabilities to adapt to a changing world. In this context, the NPR and its implementor clearly call for new capabilities to support decision makers. Another thread calls for transformation, and certainly no one questions the fundamental transformation represented by the New Triad. In short, the way presented by the NPR and its implementer are supportive of the ends established by the NSS, NMS, and QDR, but one might question whether the means to achieve these ends have been identified as clearly. One example may be whether the Services have been sufficiently resourced (and overseen) to field advanced conventional weapons and platforms to replace some capabilities previously provided by nuclear weapons. It is also not clear that there is sufficient risk mitigation in the event these advanced weapons are not forthcoming, or that the idea of modifying or transforming nuclear weapons (vice simply drawing down numbers) has been thoroughly examined in order to provide such mitigation.
NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY GAP
The United States most likely will achieve1700-2200 operational nuclear warheads by 2012. However, the intelligence community recognizes that enemies (current or potential) are increasing their capabilities to threaten the United States or deny/disrupt our ability to deal with those threats -even with nuclear weapons. agencies to develop, test, and field these advanced conventional weapons. Adequate funding is required to help mitigate the mid and long term risk associated with reduced numbers of operational nuclear weapons at the same time the stockpile, its associated infrastructure, and personnel expertise continue to age. In order to assess this issue, one must first understand 
% Facilities
Nuclear weapons have a unique capability to deliver damage to deep targets through the multiple effects of coupling the blast effects with the ground -thereby creating shock waves that essentially crush the tunnel facility. However, even nuclear weapons have limitations in relation to target destruction effectiveness at great depths. The weapon must survive the penetration of existing soil or rock conditions in order to achieve coupling sufficient to crush the facility and, of course, the yield of the weapon must be sufficient as well.
FIGURE 4. CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR DAMAGE MECHANISMS
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DELIVERY TIME Current families of conventional penetration weapons must overcome a particularly difficult lethality equation in order to be considered a viable strike option. In general, heavy weapons equate to longer delivery times. Theater based cruise missiles and UAVs can be launched relatively quickly, but lack the destructive explosive power to threaten UGFs.
Relatively massive bombs carry larger explosive packages, but must be carried by bombers requiring longer generation times ( Figure 5 ) if launched from CONUS. Similarly, more weight or sheer mass added to a weapon to increase its penetrative capability will reduce the amount of explosives it can carry. One may be able to create a weapon that can penetrate to impressive depths, but, if it only carries a several kilogram explosive package its military usefulness may be negligible. Additionally, there is an upper limit to the weight carrying capacity for a heavy bomber. Weapons with sufficient weight and explosive capacity to threaten certain categories
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of HBDTs may only be singly loaded -again limiting bomber effectiveness if sortie rates are of concern.
Finally, some have advocated capitalizing on the relatively simple physics equation of KE = ½ MV 2 (KE = kinetic energy; M = Mass; V = velocity) in order to harness the energy and rapid delivery times offered by SLBM, ICBM, or short range missile delivered conventional or inert warheads -in the same way sabot tank rounds destroy their intended targets. While this concept is viable, its effectiveness is limited against deeply buried targets due to rapid energy however, beyond a proposed nuclear penetrator, will defeat deeper UGFs.
Massive Ordinance Penetrator
The Massive Ordinance Penetrator (MOP) would be an extremely large cousin to the existing family of precision-guided heavy bombs. It is an intriguing yet relatively unimaginative approach to the problem of penetrating through difficult soil and rock conditions. Intriguing because of its sheer size; unimaginative because it adheres to the mindset of bigger = better.
The MOP, if fielded, would weigh nearly 14 tons with approximately three tons of high explosive.
Its potential penetrative capability could threaten tunnels at depths greater than 100 feet ( Figure   6 ). More importantly, its design may provide sufficient flexibility to add other payloads (nuclear or agent defeat) in order to achieve desired effects.
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Hypersonic Strike Weapon
The Navy is currently testing a hypersonic strike (HyStrike) weapon designed to travel at velocities greater than Mach 4. The technologies advanced by this design will allow for increased responsiveness due to its speed and approximately 700 mile range. It would threaten facilities at depths up to 13 meters due to its 700 lb payload as well as its velocity. 27 It could be fielded by 2012 with appropriate funding.
Inert Reentry Vehicle/Reentry Body
Scientists have studied the potential for removing the nuclear physics packages from Reentry Vehicles (RVs) and Reentry Bodies (RBs) carried by ICBMs and SLBMs. The addition of penetrative rods, GPS guided system, extensive range, responsiveness, and velocities in excess of 15000 ft/second give these potential weapons significant destructive power.
However, the policy implications of utilizing these nuclear weapon designs are problematic.
How does an adversary with adequate radar warning and nuclear response capability distinguish between an actual or inert warhead? As mentioned previously, though extremely accurate and capable of delivering impressive kinetic energy to a target, inert RV/RBs do not threaten deeper HDBTs due to rapid energy dissipation at the target surface.
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) is the only potentially new nuclear weapon specifically mentioned in the NPR implementor. It would be a marked improvement to the B61-11 penetrating weapon in that it would possess improved survivability against a wider range of soil or rock conditions, as well as an improved physics package designed for variable yields. It does not, however, have a planned precision capability. Current legislative prohibitions against new weapon development or low yield studies would have to be lifted to take the RNEP beyond currently funded feasibility studies. 28 Political considerations as well as timelines necessary to field such a weapon would again be problematic. The B61-11 took over five years from conceptualization to fielding, and that effort entailed making a modest improvement to an existing bomb casing in order to increase its penetrative capability.
29
NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Does the United States need a new nuclear weapon to fit into the New Triad -beyond the RNEP feasibility study called for in the NPR and implementer? Specifically, should the United
States develop a nuclear weapon that is precise, low yield, and can threaten deeply buried targets without the fall-out consequences of detonating a high yield weapon? If one listens to marginalists (those who desire to keep nuclear weapons fundamentally unfeasible both politically and militarily) and eliminationists (those who desire to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely), then the answer is a resounding "no." 30 Eliminationists view nuclear weapons as possibly leading to the end of the world, literally, at least in the case of a major nuclear exchange. Those not killed by prompt effects (radiation, blast, and thermal fires) would face freezing temperatures and starvation brought on by a "nuclear winter." 31 In their view, the only good nuclear weapon is one that does not exist. Others see development of "bunker-busting nuclear warheads" as a dangerous precedent producing few military advantages. Essentially, nuclear weapon development might undercut nonproliferation efforts due to perceived unfairness inherent with developing nuclear weapons that threaten enemy sanctuary, yet denying those (enemy states) the right to develop nuclear weapons themselves for selfprotection. They also argue that conventional weapons, through improved intelligence, could effectively destroy these typically difficult to destroy facilities. 32 Furthermore, making nuclear weapons more feasible politically (e. g., reduced collateral damage) might lower the threshold for use, in effect blurring the line of distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons. 33 Others feel that US national security would improve if "tactical" weapons are banned and dismantled entirely. In their view the United States should declare the sole purpose for nuclear weapons is to deter and respond to another country's first use of nuclear weapons. They also believe the United States should immediately ratify the CTBT. 34 Still others believe that the scientific logic behind building a precise, low yield, HDBT-killing weapon is flawed: precision can be easily fooled by enemy deception programs; low yield can be defeated by merely burying the facilities deeper; and one cannot sufficiently contain the fallout from a nuclear weapon, thereby lowering the COE to an acceptable level. 35 On the other hand, there have been nuclear weapon advocates who have argued that a precise, low yield, earth-penetrating weapon (or at least a variant of it) is exactly what US security requires. A precision-guided 5-kiloton weapon could vaporize a 30-foot thick silo door; whereas current US weapons rely on higher yields to achieve the same effects with less precision. These "new" nuclear weapons would by their nature be simpler in design, easier to build and maintain, and would require a less robust infrastructure to support them. UGTs for new designs should not be ruled out. Designs taken off the shelf may not require resumption of underground testing, but the United States should be prepared to execute a test if required. 36 Others have analyzed the utility of reduced collateral effects weapons. They recognize that current nuclear weapons with inertial guided systems require higher yields to achieve sufficient damage expectancies, thereby causing significant collateral damage. In essence, this might lead to what has been called self-deterrence on the part of the United States. This could, in turn, embolden enemies who believed they were safe from nuclear weapons and pursue dangerous courses of action. 37 For those who argue that conventional weapons, particularly new advanced conventional weapons, can effectively engage and destroy enemy deeply buried targets, there are others who have conducted research that demonstrate that nuclear weapons are still required for defeating extremely deep targets. 38 As mentioned previously, adversaries have learned from US ability to defeat surface and near surface bunkers. Target categories of leadership, Command and Control (C2), WMD production and storage, and critical infrastructure have been going underground. The concern is plausible that rogue leaders believe they can simply dig and provide sanctuary for themselves and their WMD capability.
39
CONCLUSIONS
Is the New Triad congruent or divergent with US national and military strategy?
Congruent if one confines the discourse to the ends described by recent strategic documents; divergent if one considers the lack of specific means to achieve the desired end state described in the NPR. There is insufficient evidence that the actions prescribed by the NPR implementer will result in sufficient nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in the requisite timeframe ( seems prudent to modify a small number of existing nuclear weapons, while moving others to an inactive or retired status. This would give the nation not only a required capability, but could contribute to a revitalized and restructured nuclear infrastructure.
Modification of nuclear weapons is not without inherent fiscal and legislative dangers.
Problems with DOE's SSP are acknowledged and aggressively pursued by Congressional auditors. 41 Unless DOE and NNSA transforms and adjusts its fiscal management appropriately, new nuclear initiatives may be dead on arrival before they can be seriously considered. Though DoD cannot oversee this transformation or fiscal accountability, it can reestablish itself as the chief driver and customer for NNSA nuclear programs. This includes supporting the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) and establishing clear requirements to move the RNEP beyond paper studies. There must also be more realism in the prospects of conventional advanced weapons capability to defeat HDBTs in order to make necessary programmatic and fiscal adjustments. 42 The result will be a truly broad and comprehensive set of capabilities available to the President as called for in all current national and military security documents. Improving nuclear weapons through proven and readily available technologies mitigates the high risk associated with advanced conventional weapon research. Failure to achieve the NPR's end state may result in an inability for the United States to assure allies, and to dissuade and deter adversaries as stated in the QDR. Similarly, the United States may find itself hard pressed, if deterrence fails, to swiftly defeat a determined enemy. A dramatic statement perhaps, but can the country afford the risk?
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